Wednesday, September 9, 2015

"Do it Yourself"

Towards a New Era in the Arab World

Not for the first time, The Economist picks a whopper of a headline. At once, the venerable British weekly ties up the era upon us Arabs with the one we’re staggering away from.

And it took the magazine’s Sarah Birke no more than a page to describe vistas of abject failure, all pregnant with consequence like this one:

Egypt is a glaring case. Take education: although public spending on schooling has risen in nominal terms, it dropped from 5.1% of GDP in 2003 to 3.6% in 2013, according to government figures. The World Economic Forum ranks Egypt’s primary schools as the third worst in the world. Too many students cram into dirty classrooms. Parents say teachers often do not bother to turn up, or demand bribes to give the children a passing grade when they do.

I would have chosen the even more evocative one of cats roaming public wards and feces everywhere in the bathrooms, but I like cats and the feces part has a way of laying siege to the imagination.

The short of this sordid tale is that the Arab state has become the plague: it still has enough strength to make life absolutely miserable for us in a rich variety of ways but little mind to deliver on the “bare necessities” and basic services that are essential benchmarks for its raison d’ètre. More than that, progressively it has all but thwarted the developmental struggles of its societies. When it comes to performing for the people, the Arab public sector creaks and leaks and spits out hooey; when it comes to smothering the fury borne out of chronic letdown, the state’s security apparatus snaps into attention, brandishes its tools of coercion and violence and proceeds to smother and silence.

But that the Arab public sector is at the end of its tether, and ipso facto so are we, is neither here nor there. For both fallen states and still intact ones, post-uprisings, the pressing question is to what end, because these breakdowns don’t just impact the quality of life, they actually dare to change the very fabric of it. If we were to take just those threads that bind people to polity, already the tears portend a demonstrably different relationship between rulers and subjects. Where the center has buckled, much authority and jurisdiction shall inevitably devolve to the limbs. Where the center holds, the trends, though quieter and shyer, point in the same direction. And as more responsibilities pass to regions and cities, the give and take between governors and governed necessarily becomes more organic, more direct, more fruitful.

Equally, the deepening inequities and multiplying service gaps have provoked a mixture of NGO interventions, civic activism and entrepreneurship (mostly youth inspired and social) whose responses cover the entire distance between band-aid relief and solution. The result is busy, freewheeling ecosystems, where old traditional setups (many donor led and far removed from supposed locales of interest) have had to give way to newer grassroots, community-based initiatives and high tech innovations that suggest a fundamental shift in expectation and prerogative.

There is nothing neat or synchronized or uniform about these multifarious challenges to business as usual. And, as street agitations by would be citizens in Lebanon and Iraq are showing, even in feckless systems the willingness to cede space is messy and painful. But such is the trajectory both in states made irreversibly feeble by civil war and those irretrievably spent by rapacious economic agendas, ineptitude and corruption.

It is far too early to weave an overarching narrative of this bottom-up action or envision the mechanics between rising city-states and contracting central governments, which, however weakened, can neither be neutralized nor circumvented. But as varied, scattered and disconnected as these shifts seem, there already is a continuum that, for example, connects youths fixing up neglected roads in fringe Jordanian towns with online educational tools like the Egyptian Nafham, with the composting innovations of Lebanese Cedar Environmental, with the Egyptian doctors who took and posted the pictures of their hospitals, with regional community development initiatives like Ruwwad al Tanmeya… An overriding approach to constituency advocacy is taking shape, enablement and facilitation are being tested as methods of slow disruption and change and technology is being deployed in the service of social ends. This at a time when the once omnipresent Arab governments are clearly unable to resist the pull of diffusion and decentralization.

Do it Yourself, in a sense, is graduating from motto to manifesto--one that is impatient with dogma, unimpressed with conventional wisdoms, solutions focused and inventive. It is true that the Arab world is upon a new era, many features of which have yet to take hold. It is true as well that to each country its priorities and pace. But of all the emerging realities that are proposing to define the new age, this is the one to watch.

Saturday, August 8, 2015

Parting Shots & Random Thoughts on Islamism Now & Tomorrow and Other Some Such Delights

After the 1967 catastrophe, several particularly mean jokes started making the rounds about Gamal Abd al Nasser. Even we, nappies barely dry, would throw them around laughing, as if to usher in the post-Nasser era.

The meanest of the jokes went like this:

After the ’67 defeat, Nasser stood, chastened, on the presidential  balcony to deliver a speech to the throngs.

“The fundamental question is not the land,” he sang. "The main question is to be or not to be”—ann nakouna aw la nakouna. In Arabic, nakouna can be flipped into one nasty mother of a pun: a straight up “they f---- us.”

And the people, of course, chanted back: “Nakouna, nakouna, nakouna!”

From that infamous June onwards it was downhill for the champ. The rejection was not immediately perceptible. Millions turned out for Gamal’s funeral in 1970, a few dying crushed by the crowds. And the subsequent decades paraded various wanna be Nassers—Arafat, Saddam, Pa Assad, Qaddafi…--each terrible in his own way, all authors of wrongs infinitely worse than the big man’s. In these mimics, it seemed, was proof of the lingering appeal of the Nasser model: the military strongman-cum-daddy-cum-poet-cum-philosopher-cum-wizard-cum-ghoul here to make it all go away, even if it meant life itself. A Faustian bargain of a sort, if you like. For if the longevity of these despots has been a testimony to anything, it’s not their success in lifting up their struggling societies to soaring heights but in the efficacy of their tyranny in beating them to the ground.

So much so that 40 years on, the post-‘67 sharp pivot towards political Islam is the easiest takeaway from Nasser’s bequest; so easy, in fact, it’s the first thing experts blurt out, Pavlovian like, every time they’re asked about Nasserism. Were it not for the myriad disappointments with the bombastic Arab nationalist, pseudo secular, fake socialist promise, Islamism would not have stood such an attractive suitor at the Arab door.
This, needless to say, is a gross oversimplification of the factors—some grassroots and unbidden, others high-powered, moneyed and very purposeful--that implanted Islam at the heart of Arab life: our laws, our streets, our living rooms, pants, panties, bedrooms, bathrooms. But it works well enough for this post’s point: 20-30 years from now, when our grandchildren pick through the history nearest to them for clues about the demise of Islamism, it will be today’s jokes that will give the story away--the jokes, first and foremost, and then the frightening vistas, the loud anecdotes and the frantic whispers that, together, betray a narrative much larger than each on its own tells.

Rather idiotic of me—wouldn’t you say?--to venture such predictions in the boisterous presence of ISIS and the Nusra Front and Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army and Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, to mention only a few of the leading stars in this seemingly flourishing universe. Idiotic as well in full view of the swords cutting off infidel heads, machetes bringing down idols, girls being sold off as sex slaves and black flags running over government buildings while the tax man collects dues from the town’s dhimmis. Idiotic, no doubt, while we spectate a crude Iranian-Saudi joust presumably pitting Shiites against Sunnis in an apocalyptic fight; equally, when the three powers (Iran, Turkey and Israel) presiding over the region are each run by a paranoid and voracious politico-religious cabal.

Still more idiotic, when eight Middle Eastern states are either avowedly or officially Islamist, and when the other ostensibly secular outfits have all but incorporated the bulk of Islamist maxims into the fabric of their polities. Worse, when the only successful democratization process we have been experiencing is in the fatwa industry, giving every other turbaned and bearded fool the platform to issue forth…on boob sucking your way into blessed male-female office relations, the various hidden meanings of farts, the evilness of Mickey Mouse.

And, of course, Hazem Amin, in a recent al Hayat piece, is right. Much like its weaker—no, wait, which month is this?--siblings, ISIS lives precisely because of withering life in our wastelands: fringe towns and cities across the Middle Eastern expanse long ago abandoned by autocracies retreating in the shadow of their betrayals and failures. This applies to states still standing and those all but gone.

Ours is, indeed, a drama of collapse that stretches over decades. Invasions, civil wars and uprisings, these are only the last straws that broke this haggard camel’s back.

But herein stands a truth so glaring and yet so muddied by the orgy of extremist violence. Much lies in ruin in the region today--regimes, states, dime-a-dozen ideologies…--and Islamism is no exception. The vacuums that dot our landscapes may be multiplying but they’re not new and neither are the fundamentalists that have inhabited them like scavengers would swamps. The recent fury that is mesmerizing the crowds is not of an explosive idea that has arrived, but of a battered one that is finally dying.

Islam has, over the course of half a century, been mercilessly thrown into the public arena. The result is a religion that reigns over the masses, graceless, face a million scars, name sullied, hands bloodied, at once ridiculous and mystifying in its cruelty to followers and adversaries alike. Islam, thanks to Islamism and its patrons, domestic and foreign, has by turns become an ogre and a joke to its own flock.

Professor Asef Bayat, one of the scholars who first detected the creeping blowback in Iran in the mid-1990s, has bestowed a rather sweet label on the shifting trends.  Post-Islamism, he called the emerging mindset—the subtle, incremental pushback of the pious, partly in search of a middle ground between the dictates of increasingly invasive and suffocating strictures and the demands of modern life, and partly in an effort to extricate Islam (rescue it, really) from the political machinations and shenanigans of its enforcers.

But this! This is all out war within the Islamist family. They’re at each others’ throats: zealous states versus even more zealous non-state actors, Shiite versus Sunni paymasters, official Islamist parties versus Jihadi insurgent movements, Islamist presidents versus former darling mentors and preachers, firebrand grand ayatollahs versus reformed ex-prime ministers.  

And the fatwas? Pretty much like trinkets and firecrackers at the fun park.

There is more disruption ahead, to be sure. Ruptures, flight, tormented children, smothered youth, harassed minorities, blood and anguish, corpses and mass graves are often the stuff of upheaval, and ours is one on the grandest of scales.  But what makes this moment extraordinary is that, for the first time in practically a century, systems of life, deeply held beliefs, are passing and, as yet, there are no new petitioners anywhere in sight. It’s as if we’ve taken to the proverbial broom to sweep away every broken promise in the house. And no promise has proved more lethal than that of Islamism, especially to Islam itself.

It is foolhardy to underestimate the extent to which Islamic fundamentalism has managed to frame the terms of the debate on culture, gender and identity; the success it has had in peppering every aspect of the day with Islamist dos and don’ts and sensibilities; the determination with which it has vilified secularism as sheer heresy, labeling it the devil’s currency. There was never anything to be dismissive about when political Islam rose, and there certainly is nothing to be flippant about now that it is falling. When such mighty ideas crumble the damage is invariably severe and the pile up is guaranteed to be high.

So I take the Islamist fratricide very seriously--but the jokes as well. I take seriously also the quieter tales of dissent in conservative societies never more dumbfounded by the abuses and excesses of the Savonarolas in suits and ties. Aside from the obvious example of Egypt in 2012 (this is in reference to the street-level resistance to the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule and not Sisi’s coup), I take seriously the current campaign by Jordanian educators against Islamist creeds that have long pervaded Jordan’s curricula. I take seriously the polls that show 75% of Iranians have folded the prayer rug. I take seriously the news coming out of Mosul about the faithful staying away from the mosque. Every episode that is a peephole into communities revisiting once unshakable convictions, I take seriously.

The dogmas that have shaped thought and dominated politics for 50 years are, one by one, crashing, and we are watching the wreckage in real time. True, there are regimes still standing, some even thriving, and authoritarianisms on the rebound, strongly suggesting that the Arab status quo is showing resilience and bounce. But this argument is premature and beside the point. The collapse need not be wholesale and indiscriminate for it to be catastrophic to the very precepts that underpinned and gave impetus to the old order. The fact is our slate has never been wiped this clean.

And the future?  For that, one has to stay close and stay tuned.

Monday, March 23, 2015


Landscapes, in childhood’s dream, were so vast and silent…[1] The avenue of Rumm…gorgeous in sunset colour, the cliffs as red as the clouds in the west, like them in scale and in the level bar they raised against the sky…Such whelming greatness dwarfed us, stripped off the cloak of laughter we had ridden over the jocund flats….[2]

It didn’t take much for T.E Lawrence to draw his florid pen, but, my God, when it came to Wadi Rumm, the man could play it like Carmignola’s violin.

And how I remember Wadi Rumm! Five years ago, on foot, towards our tents just about ready to enter its mouth and decamp in a past unsullied and hush-hush, the present roars by on a hollering four-wheel drive. Such is the harassed state of this magnificent patch of the desert, you have to trek long and deep before you’re able to fade into the clefts and sand.

But Rumm is not Sergio Leone’s parched wilds. In that desolate expanse of rolling balls of thorn, bad men, frightened village folks and women in constant fear of being raped, only the sight of Clint Eastwood reassures. In Rumm throbs a glorious medley of life. Just so, that master of masters, Ali al Jabri wrote:

A titanic apocalypse-geology of a collapsed volcanic system, granite and sandstone, the one chipped and slivered in smooth cliff-faces like polished metal edged in shimmery blues; the other a hallucination of brilliant orange/red/gold sculpted filigree, like Hindi temples rising out of the pink…floor. People call it the desert but it’s really full of life, vast horizons studded with positive/negative polka dots of vegetable growth, alternately darker or lighter as the sun makes his short solstice trajectory…[3]

To David Lean, of course, the world owes the first cinematic nod to the Jordanian Wadi. After all, how could he give justice to the high drama of Lawrence of Arabia if he did not release Peter O’Toole to play the hero among those same old sand dunes? But as deferential as Lean is towards Wadi Rumm and its moods, in the end, his film is a Western fable, much like the agent provocateur himself. The Bedouin and his dominion are backdrops here, as they were for Lawrence back in 1916.

When I watched Theeb, a Jordanian feat and an Arab production, at last year’s Venice Film Festival, I thought, finally, the native’s own ode to the land and its people. Because of all the narratives spun about those seismic times, Theeb gently eases into the shadows the larger context—the advent of the railway, the death of the pilgrimage caravans, war, imperial intrigue…--all the while languorously caressing the indigenous ways to which it was about to lay waste.

You could say, on the face of it—and what a face it is—that Theeb is a story about innocence lost, that very moment when the future, in all its strangeness, barges in and yesterday, with all its precious familiarities, folds. A budding son of Wadi Rumm and its tribes, Theeb (as in wolf), by sheer hard happenstance, is jolted out of his blissful childhood at a time when the Levant was being yanked out of its Ottoman induced stupor by forces much larger than itself. In Theeb, both the child and his desert grapple with intrusions that are near incomprehensible to them. We know that Theeb at the end of his journey beats down the odds. We know as well that, at the end of ours, we Arabs do not.

But this is just the theme that nudges along the essential storyline. If you want a chaperone, the writers of this original script (Bassel Ghandour and Naji Abu Nowar) oblige you with this one, as if to tempt you to let go everywhere else. And surrender you must, for—truly!—what unfolds is a poem of love: love of this inscrutable terrain, by turns stunning and frightening; love of the silence, the only sound it cares to know; love of the sky above and the stars that dress it gemlike as pearls would a black velvet gown; of the day as it crawls content towards the finish line; of “the lonely moving individual, the son of the road, apart from the world as in a grave.”[4] Love of the single breathtaking shot, fleeting and yet profound. Doesn’t the heart stop early in the movie as Hussein, Theeb’s older brother, clad in pure white, vanishes into black, ushering in the stranger and his life changing plot?

Theeb is the stuff of movie making at its most wondrous and audacious. Ghandour, as writer-producer, and Abu Nowar, as writer-director, drop anchor at home and, with little resources, put raw talent to work. Not only theirs. The brilliant cast of the movie comes to you courtesy of those landscapes, not a single one of them with a minute’s experience of acting before the two filmmakers came knocking.

And when they did, the Wadi Rumm of 1916 had all but disappeared. The progeny of that generation scattered in listless makeshift villages on the outer edges of the desert, a destination now for tourists like me desperate for a night of solitude among its ravines.

Theeb is currently playing in many Arab cities, including Beirut. North American rights have been acquired recently, but release dates have not been set.

(Disclosure, just in case you’re wondering: Bassel is my nephew. And for that act of providential kindness, I am eternally grateful.)

[1] Lawrence, TE, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, p. 351.
[2] Ibid., p.375.
[3] Letter from Ali al Jabri to his friend, Antonia Gaunt, January 14, 1979.
[4] Lawrence, SPW, p. 638.

Tuesday, February 24, 2015

My City is My Country

Concrete Blocks, Beirut Central District (BCD)

There is a name for it, this meandering existence: these blocks of concrete that line the sidewalks; those checkpoints that shield our suicide bombers’ favorite spots; the embassies impregnating themselves in the middle of bustling neighborhoods; the security barriers that usher you in and out of no-go zones wringing the houses of every other big chief.

There is a name for it, this city center that shutters every time parliamentarians convene under democracy’s dome to discuss nothing. Every time the families of kidnapped soldiers set up tent to plead for answers from a government that has none.

There is a name for a city donning the ornaments of its dread. 

Families of Kidnapped Soldiers Demonstrating
in BCD
Not so long ago, Lebanon could boast alone this architecture of siege, a battered mother of grand old metropolises that had become unruly hubs of fear. Not anymore. In Sanaa, Tripoli and Benghazi; in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus; in Basra, Karbala and Baghdad, is our frightened future in pastiche. To each city, its own style and pace of degradation, it goes without saying, but from all, we can be sure this is the saddest of farewells to yesterday’s semblances of peace.  

And still, I’d like to pretend—really, I would—that this meandering existence brings an absurd quality to my Beiruti life, but the absurd has long settled into run-of-the-mill. Should a Jihadi explode in the Southern Suburbs, I pray for it as if another country. Should Bab al Tebbeneh and Jabal Muhsin do battle across Syria Street up north in Tripoli, I mourn it as if another continent. Should an assassin’s target shatter around, for example, Solidere’s STARCO, I fret. Shit! This is right up my alley.

Some dilemmas refuse to die in this locale: which districts to shun, which cantons to avoid, which roads to skip, cafes to hang out in—and not. When to stay down and put and when to ignore the gunshots. For spooks and fly-by-night lovers this is such fun. For the rest of us, this late in the game, the silly hype is all but moot.

This is the way we are. The way we live. Checkered days in checkered cities in a checkered country. Neither at war nor in repose. Or as the Daily Star put it in a fleeting moment of eloquence, “Neither in emergency nor in development mode.”

But as makeshift and haphazard as they might appear, the architectural eyesores mark the surface of this withering state, much like they would a brigand’s face. These blights and scars tell tales about lineal bad behavior and full-blown system failure. In fact, they’re of a piece with the tattered politics we have come to wear so well.

Sunni-Alawite collisions in Tripoli, terrorists hanging about freely in Sidon’s Ain al Helweh, Hezbollah and Jihadis fighting it out in “peripheral” Qalamoun and Arsal, the president’s empty chair even when he’s there…: these are just a few of the particulars of a “Lebanon” in total disarray.

A Main Entrance to the City Center

And, of course, with the roadblocks and barricades come battalions of steel and glass skyscrapers laying waste to our historical memory; greenery strewn for the populace, the way scrooges would breadcrumbs to the hungry; traffic choking the arteries of a capital housing literally half of this warring family; exorbitant electricity that lights up only for the finest of Beirut…

Like this, and forever, I can go on.

And so we meander, at times furious, at others oblivious, going about our chores as best we can, marveling at how well we are doing—considering. Art, we have. Plenty! Entrepreneurship too. Promising startups spawning great products. Corruption is nearly everywhere, true. But the book fairs dot the year and the music festivals turn the summer into one happy sing along.

Nada Sehnaoui's Haven't  15 years of Hiding in
Toilets Been Enough

They say we are the incubator for the rest of the Arab world. I fear we could be, with replicas outdoing the worst of our instincts. In 17 years of civil war, we sent 135,000 to their grave. Twelve and four years into their hell, Iraq and Syria, respectively, are putting our body count to shame. Let’s see in what other ways they will mimic us when they grow tired of all out slaughter and opt for violence of the low-grade range.

In preparation for what awaits me in this metastasizing Levant, I haven’t really been doing much, except watching the old order unraveling. No, not Sykes-Picot and its boundaries, but the insides of postcolonial regimes that, once upon a time, were all embracing and all mighty.

I think it was around 1992, barely a year after I had unpacked my bags in Ain al Mreisseh, when I came to understand that—for all intents and purposes, and bureaucratic formalities aside--my city is my country. Even those who still rise when national anthems play and armies parade know that this mishmash of an enclave has relinquished its monopolies on practically all levers of authority, sacrificing with it any exclusive claim on loyalty.

You could say this is the Lebanese version of the Arab city-state rising, divvied up, cleansed, shambolic and all but sovereign. Other collapsing realms in this region, no doubt, have theirs.

This is contagion in a nutshell--a sieving of a sort, as communities en masse escape into safety among their kind. In its specifics, the future for far too many innocent souls may be impossible to imagine, the experts warn, but already much of what we are witnessing today is surely unimaginable.

Dubai, you ask? Well, that’s the one, I suppose, against which we will forever be juxtaposed when they cite outliers or conflicting regional trends. Dubai is one hell of a story, I’ll admit. But every time I visit, I always find it very balancing to remember the many in the dungeon when enjoying my time in the sun.

And, by the way, if you are in search of material about what in the world is wrong with the world, I recommend the latest book by Columbia University’s Saskia Sassen, appropriately enough titled Expulsions.


Tuesday, October 14, 2014

IS and BS

Give it up! From this Arab neck of the woods or not, how clueless do you feel?

I’ll be honest with you. We’re running around like plucked chickens over here. We’d like to know more, a hell of a lot more, in fact, the better to pace ourselves. And we certainly should know better, we’ve been at it for so long. But fear, I am afraid, is a contagion, and if there is an easy descriptor for the current disposition, it’s panic mode. Kind of like the feeling so many of us Lebanese have when midway to the bathroom at 2 am, lights out.

Man of the year Caliph Abu Bakr al Baghdadi has kindly offered us the latest proof that innovation can come as naturally to Jihadis as it does to the feistiest business entrepreneur: from the ashes of Iraq in 2007 to the killing fields of Syria post 2011; from financial dependence on donors to a wheeling and dealing outfit racking up cash from oil, ransoms, smuggling, extortion rackets; from a few thousand fighters to anywhere between 30,000 and 50,000; from an Iraqi magnet for mostly Arab recruits to a global outreach agency. From the fringes, as International Crisis Group’s Peter Harling aptly puts it, to the heart of the action.

Hard for the International Community of Brotherhood now, like once upon a time, to surreptitiously snigger while stamping Middle East only on these harvests. Not so long ago, the West spectated as if behind tight-shut gates. In this age of globalization, technology for all and multiculturalism partly born out of decades of postcolonial westbound migrations, it’s become a little too cozy for comfort, although if you count the dead, it does seem like our side is by far way ahead.

But no matter, I am not one to quibble over numbers. This is a certifiable situation in our collective nervous lap, and the time is now for, I don’t know, something or other.

First on the to-do list, the profiling exercises to help the Western masses understand the nature of the wretched beast. Even the New Scientist has given its two cents on what could possibly motivate Western Jihadis. In this earnest effort it joins every other news outlet and think tank.

You might want to consider peer pressure, the magazine suggests, as “in young people hooking up with their friends and going on a glorious mission.” And don’t be surprised if the fellows are nursing some kind of a grudge against whomever or whatever. For The Economist’s Sarah Birke, you also should never underestimate the knock-on effect of ennui and a muddled identity. To The Daily Beast’s Christopher Dickey, if you want to put your finger on at least a good chunk of it, you would need to fully internalize the influence of idiocy in a thug with an inflated ego. And, yes, an inflated ego in an idiotic thug works just as well. Which flirts with Gautam Malkani’s admonition in The Financial Times--the closest to the mark, in my opinion--that, “We really need to talk about lunacy.”

All necessary speculation, no doubt, but by the fourth or fifth take you begin to get the sneaking feeling that the profilers are not having an easy time with this one. And so, the reasons queue up as if in tryouts for the lead in an unfolding tragedy. Sure, much of the chatter is dramatic. But I don’t mind that so much. It’s the least observers owe this cast of Jihadi tourists marauding across a backdrop of collapsing states and dissolving borders, of black flags fluttering over conquered cities and oil wells, severed heads held up for photo ops, caliphs brandishing $25,000 Rolex watches while preaching the plague from mosques.  Of all the narratives competing to fill in the blanks in the Middle East’s many voids, this one, precisely because it is so fantastical and yet so close to home, dominates the news, not to mention the policy rooms.  

Fair enough. We get that. The very intrepid journalist Hazem Ameen, who’s been on the trail of Jihadism for many years, captures, in two recent pieces in Al Hayat Newspaper, the Hollywood that Jihadi terrains have become for unhinged foreign fantasists. These Book of Eli deserts are where the imagined, however bizarre or hideous, can turn undeniably real. What more riveting reads by Western reporters than these? And if by such obsessiveness they inadvertently dress up weirdness as mainstream, it won’t be the first time that perspective and nuance have been sacrificed thus in the Middle East.

Not to be outdone, some of our own commentators have also taken to painting with the broadest brushstrokes, none more sweeping than that of Al Arabiya’s Hesham Melhem, who laments, “Is it any surprise that, like the vermin that take over a ruined city, the heirs to this self-destroyed civilization should be the nihilistic thugs of the Islamic State?”
Just like that, hundreds of millions of Arabs, whose cities and daily routines and interests and culture and dreams and hopes and ambitions and values don’t quite tally with this macabre theater, are deemed beside the point that is ISIS and its sisters and cousins. Not that I would ever want to put down a man brooding about the sorry state of Arabhood, but if you want to write off an entire people, a good majority of them barely past 18, surely the least you could do is tell them which way is the fastest to oblivion.

And if this is, indeed, total civilizational collapse we are experiencing, what’s the use of bringing the widest lens in the shop to take in the whole wreck of a place if it demonstrably lives in ever increasing fragments? Who knows, maybe the discordant pieces offer vistas infinitely more intriguing than dust balls scampering through a haunted Dodge City? To insist that the only reality that counts is the so-called Islamic State without acknowledging (and then convincingly dismissing) the shifting realities and trends that suffuse the huge expanse around and within it is not a serious diagnosis but a howling of a sort.

You would think that, in history this fast-paced, those who scratch their chin for a living would be wise enough not to press stop for a snapshot. Where’s the fun, for heaven’s sake, in freezing Clint Eastwood in the middle of a pistol-whipping?

It tells you something, though, doesn’t it, that most gurus sobbing their way today through the page barely two years ago were applauding the Arabs for finally “rising up and joining history.”

Speaking of the underrated beauty of perspective and the accidental benefits of slow thinking, Harling, unmistakably the most astute Middle East analyst, rightly argues that ISIS is but one of the progenies of a colossal century-long failure of practically every ism in the house, including Islamism, matched only by the bankruptcy of practically every single regime this side of the Mediterranean, including those which are still standing.

In other words, the omnipresent postcolonial Arab State has just about dropped dead, the times are fluid and the vacuums are many. To Sunnis, bereft of all the old ideologies and their promise, the sense of loss, in a jarringly sectarian climate, is profound: “More and more Sunnis…experience and express the feeling that they have been deprived of their fundamental rights and are suffering persecution.” The community is “a majority with a minority complex--a powerful though confused feeling of marginalisation dispossession and humiliation.”

Iraq is gone; Syria, whole, cannot be won; even the tiny Yazidi minority, when besieged, wins American attention, while Sunnis in Syria continue to sustain huge losses on the hands of—it has to be said--Alawite Bashar Assad and his Shiite Iranian allies.

It’s reached a point where the staunch secularist Sadeq Jalal Al Azm, Syria’s preeminent intellectual, resolutely declares, “What is trampled underfoot in Syria right now is the majority and its rights, about which no one seems to speak outside of Syria.” A longstanding vociferous critic of Western interference, Azm goes on to demand that the West own up and step forward: “The West does have a role to play. Instead of letting Syria bleed, the West needs to help end Assad’s grip on the country and its future and negotiate political accommodation for Alawis within a democratic framework that will necessarily favor the Sunni majority” (my emphasis).

Provocative thoughts from Azm, which brings me to the second chore on the to-do list: How to reconcile this genuinely felt Sunni injury with the selfies with cutoff heads and burying human beings alive as a rite of passage? More specifically, where do we exactly place this testimony by a repentant Turkish Jihadi in the current discourse on the region’s geopolitics? “When you fight over there, it’s like being in a trance…Everyone shouts, ‘God is the greatest,’ which gives you divine strength to kill the enemy without being fazed by blood or splattered guts.”

It isn’t only foreigners who are stumped by the very short distance between injury and gruesome murder for the slightest sin or offense. Even those who are sympathetic to ISIS’s calling can’t quite figure out what to make of those heads rolling. So, what kind of redress might work best for this specific expression of Sunni marginalization and dispossession? Because--and I could be wrong, of course—it does all seem a bit over the top. And if it isn’t, then what label dare we slap on it to bring it into the family of run-of-the mill human obscenity?

For more perspective, let me ask the question in blunter and simpler terms: Why are we all so unnerved by ISIS and its particular brand of ire? Every corner of this earth claims victims—and victors, for that matter--whose method of choice is violence. The world over humanity brags cruelties and injustices, many committed with unfathomable nonchalance, most with a self-justified purpose. What’s so special, really, about Baghdadi et al? How are they different from those manning Assad’s torture houses or dropping his chlorine bombs? Or Samir Geagea and his countless killing sprees? Or the Hutus who slaughtered their way through 800,000 Tutsis over the course of three months? Or Israeli soldiers who, with purposeful malice, force pregnant Palestinian women to wait endlessly at the West Bank’s profuse checkpoints? Or the four men who, in 2012, gang raped to death a young woman on a New Delhi bus…?

I am picking them at random here, because context is forever king and evil is so damn facile. Obviously, we can rewind a little to everybody’s favorites: Saddam, Bokssa, Hitler, Pol Pot, Stalin… And don’t tell me you that your eyes will roll if some contrarians in our midst might at this stage mention Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

What is it, then, about Baghdadi and his men that makes them just too mad for our sensibilities? What makes this type of evil versus all others too freaky? And when Bill Maher utters verdicts like “The Muslim world… has too much in common with ISIS,” what is it about this deviancy that renders it, for this poster boy of liberalism, so emblematic of his batty world of Muslims? To no avail, I’ve been wracking my brains for days trying to remember the last time I heard a liberal Arab harrumphing about the “Christian world.” What makes Islam so tricky that it trips up even the usually more discerning among us?

More fundamentally, if you will pardon the pun, what should we make of ordinary Sunnis—educated and not, well off and not, intelligent and not, perfectly respectable and not, religious and not—finding in a blatantly rapacious ISIS and other such like movements an acceptable channel for grievance?

But then, how many times have we found ourselves asking the same question about other moments, other reigns, other terrors, that lit up places not even remotely related to Islam?

So for the last task on this week’s to-do list, on a whim, I propose that you skip all conversations profiling Western Jihadis, because, very quickly, they turn very silly. A friend said the other evening that profilers have to go micro. Well, how micro, I asked? Micro, micro, she answered. But then where’s the macro, I shot back.

See what I mean!

Once you’ve skipped this exercise, go ahead and humor Ramzi Mardini of The Atlantic Council and declare him right, when he argues that the “Islamic State Threat Is Overstated;” that every strength ISIS boasts feeds on the wrong politics surrounding it. And while you’re at it, be bold and give Ameen and Harling the thumbs up, when they point out that the military solution, even if well executed, is at best partial because the problem is, alas, only partially military. Upsetting as these two glaringly obvious facts are, you should embrace them because they will help ease the pain of policy failures about to unravel right before your very eyes.

Since at this stage you would be on a roll, resist whichever way you can the temptation to lump together 1.6 billion Muslims or wave away 375 million Arabs by way of an answer just because you don’t have one.